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In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition,
we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic
punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the
solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms
of policy co-ordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely
unnecessary.
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             It is often argued that, when capital is able to move freely, governments’
ability to rely on capital taxation becomes increasingly constrained. As a result,
fiscal authorities would be made better off by more actively co-ordinating their
tax policies or, alternatively, by relinquishing their tax authority in favour of a
supra-national authority. While the common wisdom that capital mobility exerts a
“race-to-the-bottom” on capital tax rates is widely accepted in the theoretical
literature on tax competition, the empirical literature, however, has found little
support for this outcome.
       This paper attempts to reconcile theory and evidence by extending the basic
tax competition model to account for repeated policy interactions between fiscal
authorities. It is argued that, when such interactions are associated to a systematic
“punishment” of the deviating policymaker, the Nash equilibrium outcome of
static tax competition models may not necessarily coincide with the outcome of
the tax game in the context of a repeated interaction framework. On the contrary,
governments may secure the "co-operative" outcome by threatening to retaliate if
one of them deviates from the co-ordinated tax rates. In such a case, "explicit"
policy co-ordination  – for instance via a supra-national tax authority – would not
be necessary, since "implicit" co-ordination mechanisms would in fact be at work.
       However, one could argue that some form of co-ordination may be desirable
to avoid the pitfalls associated to competition from smaller economies, when there
are strong incentives to free ride. Large regions face a weaker response of the
capital stock to tax rates, which means that they are less inclined to engage in tax
competition. By contrast, as competition generally benefits smaller economies, the
latter are more likely to be the source of negative externalities to large countries in
the absence of supra-national regulation.
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It is often argued that, in an environment in which capital is able to move
freely, governments’ ability to rely on capital taxation becomes increasingly
constrained. Fiscal authorities would then be made better off by more actively co-
ordinating their tax policies or, alternatively, by relinquishing their tax authority
in favour of a supra-national authority. While the common wisdom that capital
mobility exerts a “race-to-the-bottom” on capital tax rates is widely accepted in
the theoretical literature on tax competition, the empirical literature so far has
found little support for this outcome.
The theoretical literature on tax competition
4 is largely based on conventional
static frameworks, in which the tax game lasts only one period, thereby
disregarding the possibility of repeated interactions between policymakers.
Concerning capital income taxation, in particular, it traditionally relies on the
assumption that capital owners are sensitive to net returns to capital (i.e. to tax
differentials) when making portfolio choices or investment decisions. Settings of
these tax competition models are essentially twofold. On the one hand, small open
economies compete for a fixed amount of internationally mobile capital (e.g.
Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986), but fail to internalise the impact of their
respective tax policies on the world after-tax return to capital. On the other hand,
governments are assumed to engage in tax games à la Nash, in the context of
which they are, however, aware that their tax policy affects the after-tax return to
capital (see for instance Wildasin, 1988).  Under both settings, capital mobility
drives down capital tax rates, albeit to a lower extent in the latter class of models.
When tax revenues finance public goods, this results in an under-provision of
local public goods that negatively affects the citizens’ welfare. Nevertheless, tax
competition is welcome if governments are revenue-maximisers and subordinate
their competitive behaviour to, for example, the aim of increasing their size.
Clearly, a normative assessment of tax competition ultimately depends on the
views one has on the preferences of governments (Edwards and Keen, 1996).
Even though the above static tax competition models generally conclude that tax
competition leads to a “race-to-the-bottom”, empirical research has so far found
limited support for a significant downward effect of capital mobility on tax rates.
In this regard, a recent review of empirical studies on the sensitivity of capital
flows to tax rates by Krogstrup (2003) has also confirmed that there is no strong
empirical evidence supporting the conclusions of tax competition models.
Regarding the location choice of foreign direct investment, it is stressed that, on
the one hand, empirical evidence supports the view that the tax policy of a country
does not affect the choice of its resident investors between home and foreign
investment. On the other hand, a country’s tax policy affects the investment
decisions of prospective foreign investors.
                                                          
4 See Wilson (1999) for a comprehensive survey.
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competition model to account for repeated policy interactions between
governments. We argue that, when such interactions are associated to a systematic
“punishment” of the deviating policymaker, the Nash equilibrium outcome of
static tax competition models may not necessarily coincide with the outcome of
the tax game in a repeated interaction framework. On the contrary, governments
may secure a co-operative outcome by threatening to retaliate if one of them
deviates from the co-ordinated tax rates. In such a case, explicit policy co-
ordination via a supra-national tax authority would not be necessary. However,
one could argue that some explicit tax co-ordination might be desirable in order to
avoid the pitfalls of competition from smaller economies, when there are
incentives to free ride. This policy asymmetry relates to the fact that large regions
face a weaker response of the capital stock to tax rates, which means that they are
less inclined to engage in tax competition. By contrast, as competition generally
benefits smaller economies, the latter are more likely to be the source of negative
externalities to large countries in the absence of supra-national regulation.
To our best knowledge, there are only few papers in the literature addressing the
topic of fiscal competition in a repeated interaction framework. In his model of
property tax competition, Coates (1993) assumes that governments do not take
into account the externalities associated to the use of their domestic tax rate,
showing that there may be incentives to subsidise capital.  Cardarelli,
Taugourdeau and Vidal (2002) extend upon the framework developed by Coates,
setting up a repeated interactions model of tax competition and establishing the
conditions under which tax policy harmonisation can result from repeated
interactions between the policymakers. They show that tax harmonisation will not
prevail in the case of strong regional asymmetries
5, in which case the
establishment of a centralised fiscal authority is suggested as a solution to the tax
competition problem. In a related game theoretical approach inspired by Barro
and Gordon (1983), Fourçans and Warin (2002) also find that the lack of explicit
tax harmonisation may not lead to a “race-to-the-bottom” of tax rates, as a co-
operative outcome can result from repeated interactions between governments.
This paper aims to build upon the model by Cardarelli et al. by looking at capital
tax competition in a repeated interaction framework characterised by the absence
of capital mobility sunk costs. While such costs were postulated in their paper to
avoid a zero tax rate on capital under the assumption of linear technologies, the
underlying assumption in our paper is that production occurs according to Cobb-
Douglas technologies. Furthermore, we analyse the role of cross-country
asymmetries on the outcome of the tax competition repeated game. We adopt the
view that governments compete for a fixed world supply of capital and abstract
from welfare considerations, assuming that governments only aim to maximise
tax revenues. Moreover, governments are either short-sighted, maximising only
current revenue, or far-sighted, seeking to maximise a discounted sum of current
                                                          
5 Taugourdeau (2002) extends the analysis of Cardarelli et al. (2002) by considering a bargaining
equilibrium between governments.
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outcome ultimately sustainable, provided cross-country asymmetries remain
limited and governments are sufficiently patient.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a streamlined one-shot model
of tax competition. Section 3 extends this model to account for repeated
interactions, while section 4 concludes.
2.  The "one-shot" tax game
Let us consider a world economy consisting of two countries (indexed
with subscripts i and j), whose governments compete to tax the income of a fixed
and exogenously given world supply of capital. The allocation of capital between
country i and j satisfies:
j i k k k + = 2                                (1)
where 2k stands for the world total supply of capital. Labour is perfectly immobile
and in fixed supply, whereas capital is perfectly mobile. The gross marginal return
to capital invested in country i is given by:
1 − =
α α i i i k A r                                                              (2)
where i A is a country-specific parameter, capturing cross-country differences in
their endowments of immobile factors such as, for example, labour, land, or even
differences in total factor productivity. For the sake of simplicity, in the remainder
of this paper we shall refer to  i A  as the size of country i. The underlying
production technologies are assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas type.
Governments levy taxes on capital according to the source principle of taxation
6.
The capital tax revenue in country i is:
α α i i i i k A t T =                                             (3)
where  i t  is country i’s capital income tax rate. Perfect capital mobility implies
that net marginal returns to capital are equal in all locations. The equilibrium
capital allocation is therefore determined by the arbitrage condition:
                                                          
6 There are two polar principles of international taxation: the residence (of the taxpayer) principle
and the source (of income) principle. Under the residence principle, residents are taxed on their
whole income regardless of its origin. Under the source principle, all incomes originating in a
country are taxed in this country regardless of the country of residence of the taxpayer. The source
principle is usually assumed in models of tax competition; see Razin and Sadka (1994) for a
survey on tax competition.
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1 1 1 1
− − − = −
α α α α j j j i i i k A t k A t                                            (4)
Governments act strategically with a view to maximising capital income tax
revenue. In order to address the question of whether tax co-ordination is feasible
in the absence of any co-ordinating supranational authority, we assume that
governments are intrinsically revenue-maximisers, hence departing from the view
of governments as benevolent social planners. In this context, it should be noted
that our model abstracts not only from labour income taxation but also from
spending, so that we are focusing on a precise aspect of tax policy, namely the
taxation of internationally mobile capital.
Governments choose their capital income tax rate under the constraint that capital
is perfectly mobile, taking other governments’ tax policies as given. This is a
Nash tax game, where government i maximises its capital income tax revenue (3)
from an internationally mobile tax base under the arbitrage condition for capital
(4), taking government j’s capital tax rate as given. Government i’s reaction
function is therefore the solution to the following maximisation problem:
() []
α α j i i i i
t
t t k A t
i i
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is the equilibrium stock of capital as a function of tax rates resulting from the
arbitrage condition (4).
After some computations, the reaction function of government i,  ( ) j i i t R t = , is
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Note that although one does not obtain an analytical solution for government i’s
reaction function  i R , the property of the above expression, which implicitly
defines this function, can be easily analysed. Equation (7) is of the form:
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we studied above. In particular, we can define the inverse function
[[ [ [ α , 0 , 0 :
1 → +∞ =
− h g , which is also strictly increasing on][ +∞ , 0 . One can
easily check that  +∞ =
→ ) ( ’ lim
0 x g
x . The intersection of the curves representing the
functions f and g characterises the Nash tax rates. The qualitative properties of
these functions ensure the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of
this tax game, as illustrated by figure 1. The Nash tax rates belong to the
interval][ 1 , 1 α − .
Multiplying (7) by (8), one obtains a simple relation between 
N
i
N t x − = 1 and
N
j
N t y − = 1 :
() () ()
N N N N y x y x
2 1 α α α − = − −                                         (9)
Plugging back (9) into (7) yields a new expression, the solution of which
characterises the Nash tax rate of government i, 
N N
i x t − = 1 :
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The equilibrium allocation of capital can be also computed by plugging the Nash
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j k k A t T − = 2                              (15)
The following proposition characterises the relationship between cross-country
asymmetries in size and the equilibrium tax rates.
Proposition 1
An increase in the relative size of country i implies an increase in the Nash tax
rate of government i and a decrease in the Nash tax rate of government j.
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Let us study the sign of the polynomial:
() ( ) α α α + − − = x x x P 3
2
Since we have  () ( ) 0 3 0 ’ < − − = α α P ,  () ( ) 0 1 ’ < − = α α α P  and
() ( ) 0 1
2 > − = α α α P , we conclude that  () 0 > x P  for all  [] α , 0 ∈ x .










This proposition states that, in a two-country model, the tax rate differential is
exacerbated by asymmetries in country sizes. Intuitively, this is explained by the
fact that large countries face a weaker response of their capital stock to tax rates,
allowing them to maintain higher tax rates than small countries.
3.  Game under repeated interactions
In this section we examine how repeated interactions between
governments can affect their behaviour regarding taxation of internationally
ECB • Working Paper No 259 • September 2003 12mobile capital. Extending this simple tax competition model to a dynamic
environment, we assume that governments maximise the discounted sum of their










i i T V δ                              (16)
where  t i T ,  stands for government i’s capital income tax revenue in period t and  i δ
is government i’s discount factor. In each period t governments play a stage game
similar to the one-shot tax game described in the previous section. Clearly, an
infinite repetition of the Nash strategies is a solution to the repeated tax game,


















i j T V δ                              (18)
However, governments can achieve higher levels of capital income tax revenues
by setting capital income tax rates in a co-operative manner. For instance, they
could meet and decide on co-ordinated tax rates, not necessarily equal across








j t > ) the pair of co-ordinated tax rates. More specifically, we consider the
possibility for governments to co-ordinate on a common capital income tax rate




i t t t ).
In a framework of repeated interactions between governments, tax co-ordination
can be underpinned by trigger-type strategies. Each government co-operates and
levies the co-ordinated tax rate as long as the other government co-operates and
reverts to the Nash tax rate otherwise. In the repeated tax game, the tax strategy of
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If governments implement their tax policies in a co-ordinated manner, the
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Tax co-ordination prevails if governments have no incentive to deviate from the
co-ordinated tax rate. The deviating government reaps short-run benefits but
incurs long-run losses compared to tax co-ordination.
Without loss of generality, we shall consider the incentives to deviate of
government j in the remainder of this paper. If it chooses to deviate, government j
sets its tax rate according to its reaction function. This government’s tax rate is its
best reply against government i  playing 
c t . Hence, 
D
j t  is the solution to the
following equation, which implicitly defines 
D
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should also be noted that, not surprisingly, international capital flies from the
country that implements the co-ordinated strategy to the deviating country,




j k k > ). Government j can enjoy only once
the benefits of its treachery, as government i will thereafter revert to the Nash tax
strategy. However, government j’s value of the continuation game is the Nash
payoff, 
N
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+ − = + = 2                              (23)
Our next proposition emphasises how tax co-ordination can emerge endogenously
from repeated interactions.
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In the absence of cross-countries asymmetries, a co-ordinated capital income tax
rate is sustainable if governments are sufficiently patient.
The proof is simple and intuitive, as the result is quite similar to the folk theorem
in game theory. Tax co-ordination is sustainable if the loss incurred by the
deviating country in terms of future losses stemming from the setback from the
co-ordinated to the Nash tax strategies exceeds the short-run gain generated by









j V V T V < + = δ                              (24)







j j T T T < + − δ δ 1                              (25)
It can be easily checked that, when  j δ  tends to 1, this expression can be
simplified as:
C N
j t t <                              (26)
since in the symmetric case, we have  k k
N
i = and  k k
C
i = .
Condition (26) holds owing to the definition of the co-ordinated tax rates. Hence,
if governments’ discount factors are sufficiently close to 1, tax co-ordination can
be an outcome of the tax game with repeated interactions. It follows that in the
case of symmetric countries, the endogenous outcome of the repeated tax game
suggests that there is no intrinsic need for greater centralisation. Nevertheless,
centralised tax co-ordination or harmonisation may be desirable in the presence of
strong regional asymmetries, when there are incentives to free ride.
Our final proposition deals with the sustainability of decentralised or endogenous
tax co-ordination in the presence of strong regional asymmetries.
Proposition 3
If cross-countries differences in size are sufficiently large, decentralised co-
ordination on a common capital income tax rate is not sustainable.
In order to show that decentralised tax co-ordination cannot be the outcome of the
repeated tax game, we shall proceed as follows. First, we consider the feasibility
condition in the limit case where governments’ discount factors tend to 1. Second,
ECB • Working Paper No 259 • September 2003 15we prove that this condition cannot hold whenever asymmetries are sufficiently
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When the indicator for regional asymmetries,Γ , tends to infinity, one can easily
check from equations (9) and (10) that 
N
i t and 
N
j t tend to 1 and  α − 1 , respectively.








 − α α
C t
. Since the LHS
of this expression is strictly positive, we have shown by contradiction that
decentralised tax co-ordination is not sustainable if regional asymmetries are
sufficiently large.
4. Conclusion
Tax harmonisation in Europe is a recurrent debate. While static theoretical
models of tax competition traditionally point to the dangers of harmful tax
competition, empirical evidence supporting the extreme view of a “race-to-the-
bottom” of tax rates remains weak. This suggests that implicit co-ordination
mechanisms may in fact be at work. In this paper, we argued that repeated
interactions between policy-makers may be key to reconciling theory with
evidence. Repeated interactions and the threat to revert to the unpleasant Nash
equilibrium forever may lead to co-ordination of tax strategies also in the absence
of a supra-national tax authority.
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